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Introduction	Cricket	 historically	 consisted	 at	 an	 international	 level	 of	 ‘Test	Matches’	 played	between	 selected	 Commonwealth	 Countries.	 The	 first	 recognised	 Test	 Match,	between	 sides	 from	Australia	 and	England,	 took	place	 in	 1877	 though	 there	 is	record	of	a	match	between	the	USA	and	Canada	in	1844.	Test	Matches	are	now	spread	over	5	days	with	each	side	having	two	innings	with	three	results	possible,	a	win	 for	either	side	or	a	draw.	There	can	be	between	1	and	7	matches	 in	one	‘Test	Series’	between	the	same	countries.	Matches	were	not	always	time	limited	and	 the	 last	 ‘timeless	 Test’	 took	 place	 between	 South	 Africa	 and	 England	 in	Durban	 in	 1939.	 After	 10	 days	 play	 the	 match	 was	 abandoned	 as	 a	 draw	 to	enable	the	English	players	to	catch	the	boat	home.		There	are	now	much	shorter	forms	 of	 the	 game,	 from	 one-day	matches	 of	 usually	 50	 overs	 per	 side,	 to	 the	more	 recent	 Twenty/20	 format	 that	 consists	 of	 only	 20	 overs	 per	 side	 lasting	around	 3	 hours	 in	 total.1	Cricket	 has	 been	 firmly	 tied	 to	 concepts	 of	 English	identity,	 beyond	 sport,	 and	 the	 relationship	 to	 the	 colonies.	 Paradoxically	 and	due	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 game	 through	 the	 empire	 birthplace	 was	 originally	deemed	 irrelevant	 to	 qualification	 to	 represent	 England.	 As	 Wagg	 notes;	‘Arguably,	 nationality	 did	 not	 enter	 the	 discourse	 of	 English	 cricket	 in	 any	significant	 way	 until	 the	 1990s’.2	Whilst	 this	 can	 be	 seen	 at	 a	 national	 level	within	 the	 professional	 game,	 English	 County	 cricket,	 the	 participation	 of	‘overseas	players’	not	qualified	for	England	has	been	tightly	controlled.	The	links	to	 Africa,	 particularly	 South	 Africa,	 has	 been	 significant	 for	 both	 the	 English	national	 side	 and	 the	 County	 game.	 The	 relationship	 has	 caused	 political	controversy	 at	Governmental	 level	 demonstrating	 that	 cricket’s	 historic	 link	 to	international	 relations	 is	ongoing.	The	Kolpak	decision	was	born	out	of	a	more	contemporary	 set	 of	 political	 allegiances,	 membership	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	but	its	impact	was	firmly	connected	back	to	African	players.			The	emergence	and	development	of	cricket	in	Africa	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	expansion	 of	 the	 British	 Empire,	 and	 is	 pointedly	 not	 limited	 to	 South	 Africa.3	The	broader	African	influence	is	illustrated	by	the	combined	side	of	East	Africa,	comprising	 representatives	 from	 Kenya,	 Tanzania,	 Uganda	 and	 Zambia,	 which	was	Africa’s	representative	at	the	inaugural	one-day	World	Cup	held	at	Lords	in	1975.4		 The	 fourteen	man	 East	 African	 Squad	was	made	 up	 of	 seven	 Kenyans,	three	 Zambians,	 two	 Tanzanians	 and	 two	 Ugandans.5	This	 coincided	 with	 the	period	when	South	Africa,	the	most	prominent	of	the	African	sides,	was	excluded	from	 international	 competition	 due	 to	 the	 political	 system	 of	 apartheid	 and	consequent	 boycott.	 The	 development	 of	 cricket	 through	 the	 British	 Empire	produced	a	geographical	variation	in	the	playing	seasons	between	the	Southern	and	Northern	hemispheres.	This	was	reflected	 in	 the	 first	set	of	Minutes	of	 the	newly	 founded	 Imperial	 Cricket	 Conference	 (ICC)	 in	 1909.	 The	 ICC	 originally	comprised	of	England,	South	Africa	and	Australia	and	was	expanded	in	1926	to	include	the	West	Indies,	New	Zealand	and	India	with	Pakistan	added	in	1952.	In	
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1965	 the	 name	 was	 formally	 changed	 to	 the	 International	 Cricket	 Conference	and	Associate	Membership	introduced.	In	1989	the	third	name;	the	International	Cricket	 Council	 was	 adopted.	6	Despite	 name	 changes	 the	 initials,	 ICC,	 have	remained	 the	same.		Originally	 the	 ICC	 instigated	a	set	of	 international	 tours	 in	two	cycles	1909-1913	and	1913	-1917.	 	Either	Australia	or	South	Africa	would	tour	England	in	May	to	August	with	England	reciprocating	to	one	of	the	others	in	November	 to	 March.7	This	 seasonal	 difference	 was	 later	 reflected,	 on	 an	individual	 level,	with	African,	Australian,	West	Indian	and	New	Zealand	players	able	 to	play	 in	both	 their	own	domestic	cricket	and	also	 the	English	season,	as	paid	professionals.	English	players	were	also	able	to	travel	the	other	way.	Player	movement	 was	 dependent	 on	 a	 range	 of	 political	 and	 legal	 considerations	imposed	by	 the	host	 country.	During	 the	period	of	 South	Africa’s	 international	isolation	numerous	individual	cricketers	played	professionally	in	English	County	Cricket;	thus	the	global	movement	of	African	cricketers	has	been	driven	by	both	political	and	economic	factors.			The	development	on	the	international	one-day	tournament	from	1975	permitted	the	 Associate	 Member	 countries	 that	 qualified	 through	 the	 ICC	 Trophy	 to	compete	against	the	Test	playing	nations.8	Five	day	long	Test	Matches	inevitably	favour	the	countries	with	a	stronger	playing	base	and	infrastructure	to	hone	the	necessary	skills.	One-day	matches	can	be	more	easily	influenced	by	outstanding	individual	performances,	and	so	the	increased	significance	of	shorter	versions	of	the	game	has	allowed	the	sport	to	broaden	its	base	A	viable	tournament	and	the	desire	to	attract	an	increased	television	audience	required	more	sides	so	a	route	was	 opened	up,	 from	 the	 1979	 competition	 onwards,	 for	 qualification	 through	the	 ICC	 Champions	 Trophy.	 The	 history	 of	 the	 World	 Cup	 illustrates	 the	development	of	nations	such	as	Zimbabwe	and	Kenya	who	have	managed	to	pull	off	 shock	 results. 9 	Contemporaneously	 political	 power	 within	 cricket’s	international	 administration	 has	 shifted	 from	 the	 Marylebone	 Cricket	 Club	(MCC)	 at	 Lord’s	 to	 Asia,	 lessening	 the	 English	 influence.	 The	 MCC,	 a	 private	members	club,	was	originally	the	controlling	body	of	not	just	English	cricket	but	the	international	game.10	Now	the	national	Governing	Body	of	cricket	in	England	is	the	England	and	Wales	Cricket	Board	(ECB)	and	Glamorgan,	a	Welsh	County,	plays	 in	 the	 County	 Championship	 as	 First	 Class	 County.	 	 The	 ECB	 was	operational	 from	 Jan	 1st	 1997	 replacing	 the	 Test	 and	 County	 Cricket	 Board	(TCCB)	 that	 existed	 from	 1968	 -1996.	 Scotland	 and	 Ireland	 have	 their	 own	national	 sides	 and	 Governing	 Bodies.	 The	 forums	 of	 two	 important	 legal	decisions	 that	 have	 shaped	 the	 contemporary	 international	 game,	 and	 further	enabled	player	movement,	aptly	demonstrate	the	loss	of	power.	The	first,	Greig	v	
Insole,	 took	place	 in	 the	Royal	Courts	of	 Justice	 in	London	 in	1978,	 in	a	period	when	 Lord’s	 was	 still	 the	 centre	 of	 cricket	 administration.11	The	 case	 directly	involved	 cricket	 and	 here	 the	 legal	 forum	 and	 cricket	 authority	 were	geographically	 congruent.	 The	 second	 case,	 Kolpak,12	involved	 handball	 rather	than	 cricket,	 and	 was	 determined	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 based	 in	Luxemburg.	 The	 eventual	 impact	 however	 was	 that	 professional	 cricket	employment	 in	 England	 was	 no	 longer	 just	 a	 ‘national’	 matter	 and	 sport,	including	County	Cricket,	could	be	influenced	by	same	European	legal	principles	that	had	already	impacted,	so	fundamentally,	on	professional	football	across	all	the	major	European	leagues.	13	Fear	of	the	ramifications	of	Kolpak	caused	a	crisis	
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of	national	 identity	 in	English	cricket.	The	doomsday	scenario	was	of	unlimited	numbers	of	overseas	players	playing	in	the	County	game	disrupting	a	previously	tight	 quota	 system.	 As	 County	 cricket	 is	 the	 professional	 base	 from	which	 the	national	 side	 is	 drawn	 there	 was	 concern	 that	 the	 national	 side	 would	 be	weakened	 through	a	more	 limited	selection	pool	 .	The	essence	of	 this	 fear	was	that	English	cricket	would	no	longer	be	populated	by	English	players.				This	 piece	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 colonial	 connection,	 and	 the	 influence	 of	English	society	upon	African	cricket.	It	explores	issues	of	player	movement	and	the	 rise	 of	 international	 one-day	 cricket	 from	 1975	 through	 the	 upheaval	 of	World	 Series	 Cricket	 (WSC)	 in	 the	 late	 1970s.	 The	 key	 point	 is	 the	 analysis	 of	
Kolpak,	 a	 case	 that	 for	 a	 period	 appeared	 indirectly	 to	 drastically	 open	 up	 the	market	to	players	from	the	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	 	(ACP)	countries	that	had	 signed	 an	 Association	 Agreement	with	 the	 European	Union.	 The	 case	was	determined	at	a	time	when	cricket	in	both	South	Africa	and	Zimbabwe	was	facing	political	turmoil	and	this	combination	of	factors	led	to	a	significant	migration	of	cricketers	from	Africa	to	England.	This	in	turn	led	to	expression	of	concerns,	by	the	 cricket’s	 governing	 bodies	 in	 both	 England	 and	 South	 Africa,	 about	 the	potential	 impact	of	this	player	relocation	on	the	national	teams.	Zimbabwe	was	in	 the	 internal	 throes	 of	 both	 a	 political	 and	 cricket	 crisis.	 In	 England	political	efforts	were	instituted	to	restore	control	over	player	mobility	thus	ameliorating	the	 ‘crisis’.	 An	 obvious	 question	 is	why	 this	 very	 specific	 issue	 and	 these	 legal	decisions	are	of	 interest	to	sports	historians.	Maguire	 in	1995	sketched	out	the	common	ground	between	sports	history,	sports	sociology	and	sports	geography	citing	 his	 own	work,	with	 John	 Bale,	 on	 sports	 labour	migration.14	As	 lawyers,	operating	 from	 a	 socio-legal	 perspective,	we	would	 argue	 that	 the	 history	 and	sociology	of	 specific	 events	or	 the	 sport	 itself	 are	 important	 to	understand	 the	legal	 decisions	 and	 the	 broader	 influence	 of	 law.	 From	 the	 other	 direction	 an	appreciation	of	the	role	of	law	in	shaping	sport	and	constructing	sporting	values	contributes	to	the	common	ground	referred	to	by	Maguire.	Disregarding	the	law	this	 short	 period	of	 player	migration	 is	 part	 of	 the	historical	 lineage	of	 cricket	from	its	very	origins	that	can	be	of	interest	to	historians	of	both	cricket	and	sport	more	generally.			
	
	
The	Empire,	Cricket	and	Africa:	English	County	Cricket	as	escape	route			The	 relationship	 between	 cricket	 and	 the	 British	 Empire	 has	 been	 well	documented	but	the	connection	is	far	more	complex	than	a	simple	transference	of	 a	 sporting	 culture.	 As	 Allen	 notes,	 cricket	 was	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 cultural	domination	 that	 was	 rooted	 in	 a	 sense	 of	 racial	 superiority	 and	 a	 desire	 to	civilise	 Africa.	15		 In	 this	 analysis	 cricket	 was	 intimately	 tied	 to	 the	 politics,	economics,	class,	law,	religion,	morality	and	the	culture	of	the	era	in	addition	to	the	individual	personalities	who	shaped	the	sport.	 It	was	far	more	than	a	game	imported	and	played	by	colonists.	Allen	does	note	the	pragmatism	that	led,	in	the	West	 Indies,	 to	 a	 more	 relaxed	 approach	 to	 participation	 in	 terms	 of	 racial	background.16	Tours	 from	 England	 were	 used	 to	 promote	 not	 just	 cricket	 but	
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wider	values	and	reinforce	the	ties	to	the	British	Empire.17		According	to	Birley	Lord	 Harris	 observed	 ‘that	 cricket	 had	 “done	more	 to	 consolidate	 the	 Empire	than	any	other	influence’”.18	Cricket	was	viewed	an	important	part	of	the	process	of	Anglicising	South	Africa:			 ‘For	Harris	and	 fellow	 imperialists,	 the	game	was	significant	 throughout	the	empire	in	providing	a	cultural	and	sporting	bond	that	not	only	could	transmit	the	important	scriptures	of	British	civility	but	also,	in	his	words,	had	become	“a	strand	in	the	elastic	cord	which	unites	the	Colonies	and	the	Mother	country”’.19		Desai	 and	Vahed	make	 the	 point	more	 bluntly,	 arguing	 that	 in	 Victorian	 times	cricket	was	seen	as	a	useful	way	of	disciplining	colonials	and	fostering	muscular	Christianity;	‘[i]n	South	Africa,	cricket	came	to	represent	British	class	ideology	in	relation	 to	 Afrikaners	 and	 racist	 exclusion	 in	 relation	 to	 blacks’.20	Allen	 notes	that	 the	English	cultural	values,	so	 intimately	embodied	within	cricket,	 led	 to	a	weakening	of	Afrikaner	interest	during	the	Boer	war	period.21		Birley	argues	that	South	 Africa’s	 key	 asset	 –	 gold	 –	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 Springboks	 were	admitted	 to	what	 he	 called	 the	magic	 circle	 of	 Test	 cricket.22	The	 strong	 South	African	support	 for	the	foundation	of	the	ICC	demonstrates	the	close	cricketing	ties	between	the	two	countries	and	Pelham	Warner	saw	the	ICC	as	the	obvious	link	 between	 the	 MCC	 and	 the	 overseas	 cricketing	 countries.23	The	 natural	location	 of	 the	 ICC	 at	 Lord’s	 represented	 its	 close	 physical	 ties	 to	 the	MCC.	 In	terms	of	South	African	cricket,	Desai	and	Vahed	note	that	its	story,	like	the	defeat	of	apartheid	 itself,	 is	often	told	 in	overly	simplistic	 terms.24	Cricket,	and	 indeed	sport	generally,	is	entwined	with	South	African	history	and	a	fundamental	part	of	the	 national	 psyche.	 Relations	 between	 sport	 and	 politics	 are	 undoubtedly	complex	and	require	detailed	analysis.	The	critique	of	Desai	and	Vahed	explores	this	 complexity;	 ‘Mandela	 met	 De	 Klerk.	 Graeme	 Pollock	 met	 Basil	 D’Oliveira.	Apartheid	had	been	stumped.	Past	and	present	merged.	The	covers	were	pulled	off	 to	 reveal	 a	 level	 playing	 field.	 Another	 “small’	 miracle.	 Critical	 voices	 of	dissent	were	drowned	out	by	the	over-arching	language	of	nation-building’.25			The	 crucial	 period	 for	 South	 African	 cricket,	 and	 indeed	 South	 African	sport	in	general,	revolves	around	the	Basil	D’Olivera	affair	in	1968.26	The	furore	around	his	 original	 non-selection,	 and	 later	 reversal,	 for	 an	MCC	 tour	 of	 South	Africa	precipitated	a	series	of	events	that	led	to	the	eventual	exclusion	of	South	Africa	 from	 international	 sport.	 These	 events	 included	 the	 series	 of	 protests	around	 the	 Springbok	 rugby	 tour	 of	 England	 in	 1969-70	 that	 led	 to	 the	cancellation	 of	 the	 1970	 South	 African	 cricket	 tour	 to	 England.	 27 	The	International	Olympic	Committee	(IOC)	duly	expelled	South	Africa	that	was	later	followed	by	the	unanimous	approval	of	the	Gleneagles	Agreement	 in	1977.	The	Commonwealth	of	Nations	agreed	to	formally	discourage	both	contact	with	and	competition	against	South	African	teams	or	individuals.	The	bans	and	exclusions	were	crucial	to	the	eventual	removal	of	the	system	of	apartheid	in	South	Africa.	As	Peter	Hain	noted,	 ‘Sport	was	 intrinsic	 to	 the	very	 fabric	of	apartheid	and	 its	maintenance	 on	 a	 racist	 basis	 was	 therefore	 important	 to	 the	 continuation	 of	apartheid’.28	The	exclusion	of	South	Africa	from	international	sport	undoubtedly	accelerated	 political	 change.	 The	 IOC	 lifted	 its	 ban	 in	 1991,	 therefore	 allowing	
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participation	at	 the	Barcelona	Olympics	 in	1992,	 following	the	official	abolition	of	 apartheid.	29	Arguably	 full	 abolition	of	 apartheid	only	occurred	 following	 the	general	 elections	 of	 1994.	 Participation	 at	 the	 1995	Rugby	World	Cup	 and	 the	1996	 Cricket	World	 Cup	 demonstrated	 that	 South	Africa	was	 now	 returned	 to	the	 fold	 of	 international	 sport.	 During	 the	 period	 of	 isolation	 numerous	 high-class	South	African	cricketers	had	sought	to	practice	their	trade	as	professional	players	in	England.	
 Permitting	an	influx	of	overseas	professional	players	into	English	County	Cricket	 had	 required	 a	 change	 in	 the	 qualification	 rules	 that	 in	 the	 1960s	required	residency	within	the	County	boundaries	for	two	years.	The	pressure	for	change	 came	 from	 the	 Counties	 themselves	 who	 saw	 the	 allure	 of	 overseas	players	as	a	means	to	revitalise	their	ailing	finances.	The	regulations	altered	in	a	slow,	 piecemeal,	 fashion	 before	 immediate	 registration	 without	 a	 residential	qualification,	was	permitted	 from	the	1968	season	but	with	a	 limitation	of	one	player	for	3	years.30	It	was	hoped	that	the	‘stars’	of	the	international	game	would	attract	the	spectators	who	had	deserted	County	Cricket,	especially	with	a	new	40	over	 League	 competition	 sponsored	 by	 John	 Player.	 This	 development	 also	opened	up	a	new	revenue	stream	via	opportunities	provided	by	 live	 television.		From	this	point	onwards	top	South	African	players	took	advantage	of	the	shift	in	regulations.	Some	such	as	Barry	Richards,	Eddie	Barlow,	and	Mike	Procter	had	already	played	international	cricket	before	the	ban.	A	second	group,	who	hadn’t	previously	 played	 for	 South	 Africa,	 saw	 an	 opportunity	 to	 play	 international	cricket	 by	 representing	 England	 through	 parental	 qualification.	 	 Playing	 in	 the	County	game	was	important	to	showcase	their	talents	to	the	selectors.	This	latter	group	included	Tony	Greig,	Ian	Greig,	Chris	Smith,	Robin	Smith	and	Allan	Lamb.	Other	players	such	as	Peter	Kirsten,	Garth	Le	Roux,	 Jimmy	Cook	and	Clive	Rice	played	professionally	 in	England	and	returned	to	play	 internationally	 for	South	Africa	once	the	ban	was	rescinded.31		Graeme	Hick,	who	was	born	in	Zimbabwe,	played	County	Cricket	 and	qualified	 for	 the	national	 side	 through	a	 seven-year	residency	 qualification.	 At	 an	 international	 level	 Williams	 has	 noted	 that	historically	 Englishness	 in	 terms	 of	 national	 eligibility	 could	 be	 acquired	 or	conferred.	32		Wagg	notes	the	application	of	an	‘…ever	more	malleable	definition	of	 English	 nationality’	 to	 describe	 how	 the	 cricket	 authorities	 in	 England	responded	 to	 the	 changed	 player	 environment.	33	Outside	 of	 these	 nationality	and	 qualification	 related	 debates,	 a	 separate	 more	 commercially	 oriented	development	 was	 talking	 place	 in	 international	 cricket	 that	 would	 also	 effect	player	movement.					
World	Series	Cricket	(WSC)	and	Individual	Player	Movement	
	Permitting	 overseas	 players	 to	 play	 English	 cricket	 was	 part	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	revitalise	 the	 domestic	 game.	 One-day	 cricket	 had	 been	 introduced	 as	attendances	at	the	three	day	first	class	game	had	fallen	leaving	the	Counties	even	more	dependent	on	the	revenue	derived	from	the	national	side.	The	1975	Cricket	World	Cup	demonstrated	the	new	financial	possibilities,	and	illustrated	that	the	rights	 to	 broadcast	 games	would	 become	 sought	 after	 and	 valuable.	 Corporate	sponsors	became	key	players	and	Gillette	and	John	Player	were	at	the	forefront	
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of	 the	emergence	of	 the	one-day	game.	As	Wagg	notes	 the	creation	of	 the	 John	Player	League	amounted	to	the	MCC	reasserting	its	hegemony	and	control	over	the	 game.34	The	 battle	 between	 an	 entrepreneur	 and	 the	 cricketing	 authorities	was	 not	 long	 in	 coming	 and	 perhaps	 inevitable	 given	 the	 new	 broadcasting	landscape	and	the	potential	rewards.	As	Slade	J	observed	in	the	Greig	case:		 ‘The	 very	 size	 of	 the	 profits	which	 can	 be	made	 out	 of	 cricket	matches	involving	star	players,	however,	must	for	some	years	have	carried	with	it	the	risk	 that	a	private	promoter	would	appear	on	 the	scene	and	seek	 to	make	 money	 by	 promoting	 cricket	 matches	 involving	 world-class	cricketers’.35		The	 dispute	 originated	 in	 Australia	 and	 concerned	 the	 underlying	 issue	 of	 the	award	 of	 Australian	 test	 match	 Broadcasting	 pitching	 the	 Australian	 Cricket	Board	 against	 media	 tycoon	 Kerry	 Packer.	 It	 was	 the	 direct	 refusal	 to	 grant	Packer’s	 Channel	 9	 the	 rights	 that	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 alternative	competition,	 World	 Series	 Cricket.	 WSC	 offered	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 the	cricketing	 establishment,	 both	 nationally	 in	 Australia	 and	 internationally.	 The	rise	of	a	 rival	 competition	meant	 the	 loss	of	 control	over	 the	players	who	now	had	 alternative	 employment	 options	 not	 controlled	 by	 their	 relevant	 national	board.	WSC	contracted	34	players	that	comprised	18	Australians;	and	four	each	from	England,	 South	Africa,	 the	West	 Indies	 and	 Pakistan.	 The	 duration	 of	 the	contracts	 was	 between	 one	 and	 three	 years,	 with	 one	 lasting	 for	 five	 years.	Whilst	 for	 many	 of	 the	 players	 the	 fundamental	 attraction	 was	 money,	 the	evidence	relating	to	Mike	Procter	demonstrated	the	twin	incentives	for	a	South	African	banned	from	international	cricket:  
 
“The	 contract	 offered	 not	 surprisingly	 appealed	 to	 him,	 because	 it	 gave	him	the	opportunity	of	playing	cricket	at	the	higher	level	of	which	he	was	otherwise	 deprived	 and	 also	 offered	 some	 financial	 security	 for	 himself	and	his	family.36		Procter	duly	signed	a	three-year	contract	with	WSC	having	discussed	the	terms	with	 other	 players,	 but	 signed	 it	without	 taking	 formal	 legal	 advice.	 This	 clear	challenge	 to	 ownership	 and	 control	 of	 Test	 cricket	 and	 cricketers	 (the	 WSC	players	were	 contracted	 to	 play	 ‘test’	matches)	 required	 a	 response.	 After	 the	revelations	 in	 May	 1977	 the	 English	 Test	 and	 County	 Cricket	 Board	 (TCCB)	decided	 to	 ban	 players	 from	 participating	 at	 County	 level	 subject	 to	 an	international	ban	being	adopted	by	 the	 ICC.	 	The	TCCB	ban	was	 to	be	 formally	approved	after	the	ICC	decision	had	been	made	but	effectively	the	outcome	had	already	 been	 decided.	 The	 ICC	 took	 two	 steps	 to	 restrain	 the	 World	 Series	Cricketers.	First	it	altered	the	rules	for	player	eligibility	for	Test	matches;		‘..no	 player	who	 after	 October	 1,	 1977,	 has	 played	 or	 has	made	 himself	available	to	play	in	a	match	previously	disapproved	by	the	conference	(our	 emphasis)	 shall	 thereafter	 be	 eligible	 to	 play	 in	 any	 Test	 Match	without	 the	 express	 consent	 of	 the	 conference	 to	 be	 given	 only	 on	 the	application	of	the	governing	body	for	cricket	of	the	country	for	which,	but	for	this	sub	rule,	the	player	would	be	eligible	to	play.’	37	
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	Thus	participation	in	a	‘disapproved	match’	automatically	removed	eligibility	to	play	 Test	 Cricket	 unless	 the	 national	 Governing	Body	 e.g.	 the	 Test	 and	 County	Cricket	Board	(TCCB)	or	the	Australian	Cricket	Board	(ACB)	made	an	application	to	the	ICC.	The	answer	to	the	question	of	what	constituted	a	‘disapproved	match’	was	swiftly	clarified	at	the	same	meeting:		 ‘It	 is	 hereby	 resolved	 for	 the	purposes	of	Appendix	 I	 (f)	 that	 any	match	arranged	or	to	be	arranged	by	J.P.	Sports	(Pty.)	Ltd.,	Mr.	Kerry	Packer,	Mr.	Richie	 Benaud	 or	 associated	 companies	 or	 persons	 to	 take	 place	 in	Australia	or	elsewhere	between	October	1,	1977,	and	March	31,	1979,	is	disapproved.’	38 		The	ICC	further	sought	to	persuade	the	member	countries	to	issue	similar	bans	that	 in	 England	 had	 already	 been	 agreed	 on	 an	 ‘in	 principle’	 basis.	 Players	participating	 in	World	 Series	 Cricket	 faced	both	 an	 international	 and	domestic	ban	 from	playing	cricket.	The	problem	 facing	 the	County	Clubs	 in	England	was	the	 loss	 of	 their	 very	 valuable	 crowd	 generating	 overseas	 players.	 The	 biggest	loss	 would	 have	 been	 the	 West	 Indian	 contingent	 that	 included	 Clive	 Lloyd,	Gordon	 Greenidge,	 Desmond	 Haynes,	 Viv	 Richards,	 Andy	 Roberts,	 Joel	 Garner,	Michael	Holding	 et	al.	 All	 five	 of	 the	 eventual	 participating	 South	 Africans	 had	County	contracts;	Garth	Le	Roux	at	Sussex;	Clive	Rice	at	Nottinghamshire;	Barry	Richards	at	Hampshire	and	Eddie	Barlow	with	Derbyshire.	Mike	Procter	one	of	the	plaintiffs	in	the	action	against	the	cricket	authorities	was	a	valuable	asset:		 ‘He	has	played	for	the	Gloucestershire	County	Club	since	1968,	and	is	now	its	 captain.	 He	 is	 an	 all-round	 cricketer	 of	 great	 ability.	 Under	 his	leadership,	Gloucestershire	in	1977	completed	one	of	the	most	successful	seasons	 in	 its	 history.	 For	 that	 season	 he	 earned	 in	 all	 about	 £7,500,	 a	substantial	 part	 of	 which	 represented	 expenses	 and	 bonuses	 accruing	from	his	county's	various	victories.’39		Player	 movement	 and	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 contractual	 freedom	 and	 earning	power	 were	 at	 the	 root	 of	 this	 new	 venture,	 whilst	 the	 cricketing	 authorities	sought	 to	 retain	 control	 through	 draconian	 measures.	 This	 approach	 had	previously	 been	 used	 in	 the	 original	 battle	 over	 the	 English	 one-day	 game	between	the	TCCB,	MCC	Council	and	the	Rothman’s	Cavaliers	that	had	included	a	ban	 on	 registered	 players	 from	 participating	 in	 the	 Cavalier’s	 matches.	 The	inevitable	 crisis	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 WSC	 was	 effectively	resolved	due	 to	 a	 number	of	 pressures.	 First	 the	English	High	Court	 in	Greig	v	
Insole	ruled	that	the	bans	imposed	were	unlawful	as	an	unreasonable	restraint	of	trade.	Second	at	both	international	and	domestic	level	in	England	there	was	not	clear	 unity	 and	 Packer	 cleverly	 exploited	 the	 international	 divisions.40	Finally	Packer,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 settlement,	 obtained	what	 he	 had	 originally	 sought;	 the	television	 rights	 to	 Australian	 Cricket.	 	 The	 result	 was	 an	 end	 to	WSC	 after	 2	seasons	 although	many	of	 the	 innovations	 such	 as	 coloured	 clothing	 and	night	matches	have	 remained	and	been	developed.	 For	players	 the	post	WSC	 cricket	environment	was	a	changed	landscape.	What	the	Greig	decision	did	demonstrate	was	 that	 the	 cricketing	 authorities	 could	 not	 act	 with	 impunity	 as	 if	 run	 by	 a	
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private	members’	club.	Due	regard	had	to	be	given	to	contractual	relationships	and	it	was	a	clear	exposure	that	the	era	of	absolute	power,	exercised	by	a	small	group	in	committee	rooms	in	London,	was	well	and	truly	over.	Greig	was	not	so	much	a	decision	about	mobility,	though	this	was	a	consequence,	but	rather	about	the	character	of	the	administrative	control	of	cricket.	Ironically	the	Test	players	had	 been	 facing	 the	 type	 of	 international	 ban	 that	 the	 South	 Africans	 were	already	 subject	 to.	 Contemporaneously	 the	 South	 Africans	 were	 able	 to	participate	in	high-level	international	competition	as	members	of	the	Rest	of	the	World	 side.	 	However	 after	 the	 settlement	 the	 situation	 for	 the	 South	Africans	reverted	 to	 the	 status	quo	 with	 the	 even	more	 tantalising	 development	 of	 the	international	50	over	game	still	out	of	reach.				
	
Bosman,	Cotonou	and	Kolpak			The	 European	 Union	 and	 its	 organs	 had	 historically	 not	 concerned	 itself	 with	sport.41	Szyszak	reviewed	much	of	the	case	law	that	has	evolved	in	the	area	but	also	noted	that	the	EU	does	not	have	a	specific,	defined	policy	on	sport;	‘From	the	recommendations	 of	 the	 Adonnino	 Report	 sport	 had	 been	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 of	integration	 but	 there	 was	 no	 Treaty	 amendment	 or	 special	 policy	 created	 for	sport.	Instead	the	Court	of	Justice	triggered	an	awareness	of	the	special	nature	of	sporting	 rules	 and	 their	 relationship	 with	 Community	 law’.42	This	 view	 is	supported	 by	 den	 Bogaert	 and	 Vermeersch	who	 argue	 that	 whilst	 there	 is	 no	direct	 and	 express	 Treaty	 competence,	 Community	 Institutions	 have	nevertheless	 been	 able	 to	 create	 a	 form	 of	 direct	 sports	 policy	 by	 utilising	policies	in	other	fields	such	as	competition,	culture	or	education,	in	tandem	with	the	 ECJ	 cases	 outlined	 below.43	Various	 cases	 including	Walrave,	Meca-Medina	and	others	have	appeared,	but	it	is	undoubtedly	the	Bosman	decsion	that	stands	out	 because	 of	 the	 consequent	 effects	 on	 professional	 football	 throughout	Europe.	Bosman	addressed	both	the	issue	of	freedom	of	movement	as	well	as	the	legitimacy	of	national	quotas.	The	effect	on	cricket	was	likely	to	be	minimal	given	the	limited	penetration	of	cricket	throughout	Europe.	There	have	however	been	a	small	number	of	examples	such	as	Ryan	ten	Doeschate	who	signed	for	Essex	in	2003.	 As	 an	 EU	 National,	 through	 his	 Dutch	 citizenship	 even	 though	 born	 in	South	Africa,	he	has	eligibility	to	work	under	the	Bosman	principle.	Other	notable	examples	of	European	cricketers	include	Amjad	Khan	and	Eoin	Morgan.	Khan	is	Danish	born	but	qualified	to	play	for	England	whilst	Morgan	was	born	in	Dublin	and	had	represented	Ireland	before	playing	for	England.44	These	are	the	modern	day	equivalents	of	 the	South	Africans	who	 sought	England	qualification	during	the	period	of	the	international	ban.	The	motivation,	to	play	cricket	at	the	highest	level,	is	the	same.	The	cause,	however,	is	different.	In	the	examples	of	Khan	and	Morgan	their	countries	of	birth	were	unlikely	to	develop	their	standard	of	cricket	to	 the	 requisite	 level	 during	 their	 career.	 The	 primary	 issue	 here	 is	 the	qualification	rules	for	national	representation	rather	than	freedom	of	movement	though	 there	 are	 examples	 of	 European	 players	 who	 have	 just	 sought	 to	 play	County	cricket	as	a	profession.45	As	the	overwhelming	penetration	of	cricket	was	geographically	linked	to	the	 British	 Empire	 there	 has	 been	 limited	 signs	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 EU	
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decision	 in	 Bosman.46	The	 EU	 does	 however	 sign	 numerous	 agreements	 with	other	countries	 to	promote	both	trade	and	broader	cooperation,	and	 it	was	via	one	of	these	that	a	potential	effect	for	cricket	developed.	The	Cotonou	Agreement	was	 signed	 in	 June	 2000	 following	 negotiations	 that	 had	 commenced	 in	 1998.	The	 parties	 were	 the	 EU	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 the	 79	 countries	 from	 Africa,	 the	Caribbean	 and	 the	 Pacific		 (ACP)	 on	 the	 other.	 Members	 of	 the	 ACP	 group	included	the	cricket	playing	nations	of	South	Africa	and	Zimbabwe	in	addition	to	a	number	of	Caribbean	islands.	The	Agreement	noted;		 ‘The	 Community	 and	 its	 Member	 States,	 of	 the	 one	 part,	 and	 the	 ACP	States,	 of	 the	 other	 part,	 hereinafter	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘Parties’	 hereby	conclude	this	Agreement	in	order	to	promote	and	expedite	the	economic,	cultural	 and	 social	 development	 of	 the	 ACP	 States,	 with	 a	 view	 to	contributing	 to	 peace	 and	 security	 and	 to	 promoting	 a	 stable	 and	democratic	political	environment.’47		It	was	not,	however,	 the	Cotonou	Agreement	 that	 led	 to	 the	apparently	ground	breaking	 case	 of	 Kolpak.	 In	 this	 instance	 the	 interpretation	 was	 of	 an	 earlier	1994	Europe	Agreement,	 signed	between	 the	European	Communities	and	 their	Member	 States	 and	 the	 Slovak	 Republic.48	The	 issue	 was	 Article	 38(1)	 of	 the	Agreement	that	covered	movement	of	workers;		 ‘Subject	to	the	conditions	and	modalities	applicable	in	each	Member	State:		—	 treatment	 accorded	 to	workers	of	 Slovak	Republic	nationality	 legally	employed	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 shall	 be	 free	 from	 any	discrimination	 based	 on	 nationality,	 as	 regards	 working	 conditions,	remuneration	or	dismissal,	as	compared	to	its	own	nationals.’49			In	 Kolpak	 a	 Slovakian	 player	 was	 employed	 as	 a	 professional	 by	 a	 German	handball	 team,	but	as	a	member	of	a	 (then)	non	EEA	state	was	not	 considered	eligible	to	qualify	 for	the	benefits	of	Bosman	as	regards	nationality	restrictions.	The	Court	decided	that	an	Association	Agreement	between	Slovakia	and	the	EU	entitled	him	 to	equal	 treatment	once	 in	 lawful	 employment.	 	The	decision	was	not	 as	 wide	 as	 Bosman	 as	 it	 didn’t	 confer	 the	 right	 to	 free	 movement	 but	protected	workers	 from	discrimination	once	 they	had	entered	 the	 country	and	been	employed.	It	wasn’t	immediately	apparent	quite	how	a	Slovakian	handball	player’s	 claim	 might	 seriously	 impact	 upon	 English,	 South	 African	 and	Zimbabwean	cricket.	However	the	Cotonou	Agreement,	 that	contained	so	many	cricket	playing	countries	as	signatories,	contained	an	almost	identically	worded	provision.		 ‘Article	13	(3).	The	treatment	accorded	by	each	Member	State	to	workers	of	ACP	countries	 legally	employed	in	 its	territory,	shall	be	free	from	any	discrimination	 based	 on	 nationality,	 as	 regards	 working	 conditions,	remuneration	and	dismissal,	relative	to	its	own	nationals.	Further	in	this	regard,	 each	 ACP	 State	 shall	 accord	 comparable	 non	 discriminatory	treatment	to	workers	who	are	nationals	of	a	Member	State.’50		
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Applying	 the	 principle	 of	Kolpak	 to	 this	 agreement	 the	 outcome	was	 that	 any	lawfully	 employed	 cricketer	 from	an	ACP	 country	had	 the	 legal	 right	not	 to	be	discriminated	 against	 with	 respect	 to	working	 conditions.	 In	Kolpak	 the	 claim	had	related	to	the	type	of	licence	granted,	and	the	claim	that	this	discriminated	against	him.	The	German	Handball	Association	operated	a	 licensing	 system	 for	players	 that	 differentiated	 between	 national	 and	 ‘non	 national’	 players.	 It	was	the	 application	 of	 this	 licensing	 system	 that	 the	 Court	 held	 to	 be	 the	discriminatory	as	Kolpak	was	entitled,	by	virtue	of	Article	38(1),	to	be	treated	as	if	 he	 was	 a	 national	 player.	 It	 was	 not	 initially	 clear	 what	 impact	 the	 Kolpak	decision	would	have	in	terms	of	incoming	cricketers.	Whilst	this	was	a	decision	affecting	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 EU,	 and	 potentially	 all	 sports,	 within	 Europe	 only	England	contained	a	professional	cricket	 league.	The	 link	back	 to	 the	spread	of	cricket	 through	 the	 British	 Empire	 could	 suddenly	 be	 reawakened	 via	 a	 legal	case	as	any	player	from	an	ACP	country	once	in	lawful	employment	was	entitled	to	be	treated	without	discrimination,	and	was,	therefore,	effectively	treated	as	a	‘national’	player.	One	of	the	problems	facing	cricket	was	the	different	‘categories’	of	players	who	 played	 professional	 cricket.	 For	 the	 English	 national	 side,	 qualification	 to	play	 has	 been	 affected	 by	 a	 mixture	 of	 residency,	 birthplace	 and	 ancestry	 in	addition	to	any	eligibility	rules	imposed	by	the	International	Cricket	Council.	The	need	 to	 look	 beyond	 place	 of	 birth	 and	 include	 nationality	 harks	 back	 to	 the	empire	with	the	spread	of	personnel	many	of	who	would	have	been	involved	in	the	diffusion	of	cricket.	A	prominent	example	is	Colin	Cowdrey	who	played	with	distinction	 for	 England	 between	 1954	 -1975.	 He	 was	 born	 in	 India	 where	 his	father	 was	 running	 a	 tea	 plantation.51	Nationality	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	eligibility	 rules	 set	 by	 Governments	 that	 can	 include	 birthplace	 and	 parental	nationality	 and	may	 change	 over	 time.	 The	 first	 	 ‘Kolpak’	 player	 to	 arrive	was	Claude	Henderson,	a	South	African,	who	signed	 for	Leicestershire	 for	 the	2004	season.52	In	 order	 to	 qualify	 as	 a	 ‘non	 overseas’	 player	 he	 had	 to	 give	 up	 any	international	 ambitions	 by	 signing	 a	 ‘statutory	 declaration’	 that	 he	 would	 not	seek	to	play	for	his	national	side.	Ray	Price,	the	Zimbabwean	international,	who	signed	 for	Worcestershire,	 joined	him.	Price	 still	 retained	a	desire	 to	play	Test	cricket	 but	 with	 England	 rather	 than	 Zimbabwe	 with	 whom	 he	 was	disenchanted.53		Two	‘Kolpaks’	in	the	first	season	suggested	this	wasn’t	going	to	be	 such	a	 serious	 issue.54	It	was	however	 reported	 in	December	2004,	prior	 to	the	 2005	 season,	 that	 a	 Sports	 Agency	 was	 circulating	 a	 list	 of	 some	 80	professionals	who	would	be	eligible	and	 interested	 to	sign	as	Kolpak	players.55		The	 list	 was	 said	 to	 contain	 some	 20	 South	 Africans	 who	were	 drawn	 by	 the	salaries	 on	 offer	 that	 compared	 favourably	 to	 the	 sums	 paid	 by	 the	 Provincial	teams	at	home.56		The	news	of	the	list	produced	alarm	at	both	the	ECB	and	within	the	 Professional	 Cricketers	 Association	 though	 in	 other	 quarters	 the	 view	was	that	 the	 situation	was	being	overblown	and	 that	 such	an	 influx	was	unlikely.57	There	was	a	notable	increase	in	2005	of	both	South	Africans	and	Zimbabweans	the	latter	including	both	the	Flower	brothers	who	joined	Essex	and	added	to	the	overall	 Zimbabwe	 contingent.58	Whist	 the	 Kolpak	 case	 provided	 the	 legal	opportunity	 to	 move	 this	 was	 only	 one	 factor.	 The	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 legal	framework	were	the	requirements	to	obtain	a	work	permit	and	an	employment	contract.	 Without	 either	 of	 these	 the	 right	 to	 equal	 treatment	 under	 the	Agreement	 had	no	 effect.	 It	 also	 required	players	 from	 the	ACP	 countries	who	
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were	good	enough	to	obtain	both	the	necessary	legal	documents	and	ensure	they	were	sufficiently	motivated	to	take	the	opportunity.		Even	if	there	was	a	group	of	eligible	players	it	also	required	the	Counties	to	want	to	sign	them.		The	political	dimensions	 to	 both	 South	 African	 and	 Zimbabwean	 cricket	 created	 a	 situation	where	a	 significant	group	of	players	were	happy	 to	 forgo	 international	 cricket.	Zimbabwe	 in	 particular	 was	 undergoing	 its	 own	 democratic	 crisis	 that	 also	played	itself	out	through	the	game	of	cricket.		Cricket	in	Zimbabwe	had	been	in	very	public	crisis	during	the	2003	World	Cup.	The	hosting	of	the	tournament	was	shared	between	South	Africa,	Zimbabwe	and	Kenya	although	it	had	originally	been	awarded	solely	to	South	Africa.59		The	aim	 was	 to	 create	 an	 African	 World	 Cup.	 	 One	 major	 issue	 was	 Zimbabwe’s	ongoing	 political	 crisis	 that	 had	 led	 to	 the	 country	 being	 expelled	 from	 the	Commonwealth	in	March	2002:		‘Zimbabwe,	which	had	been	a	member	since	independence	in	April	1980,	is	suspended	from	Commonwealth	councils	in	March	2002,	following	the	presidential	 election,	 which	 was	 marred	 by	 a	 high	 level	 of	 politically	motivated	 violence	 and	during	which	 the	 conditions	 did	 not	 adequately	allow	for	a	free	expression	of	will	by	the	electors.’60			The	 problem	 for	 Zimbabwe	 was	 that	 England,	 South	 Africa	 and	 England	 all	wanted	 a	 sporting	 boycott	 to	 be	 applied.	 The	 vexed	 question	 as	 to	 whether	England	 would	 fulfil	 their	 upcoming	 fixture	 in	 Zimbabwe	 became	 clouded	 by	political	pressures	and	descended	into	indecision.61	Eventually	the	ECB	decided	not	to	fulfil	the	fixture	and	Zimbabwe	was	awarded	a	walkover,	took	the	points,	and	advanced	to	the	next	stage,	ironically	at	the	expense	of	England.62	This	was	in	fact	all	rather	overshadowed	by	what	happened	at	Zimbabwe’s	opening	game	against	 Namibia.	 Here	 both	 Henry	 Olonga	 and	 Andy	 Flower	 wore	 black	armbands	 to	 protest	 at	 the	 ‘Death	 of	 Democracy’	 in	 Zimbabwe.63		 This	 had	serious	 consequences	 with	 both	 players	 dismissed	 after	 the	 tournament	 and	eventually	 forced	 to	 leave	 the	 country.	 The	 protest	 split	 the	 cricket	world	 and	reopened	the	thorny	issue	of	the	relationship	of	the	game	to	political	issues.	The	problems	 in	 Zimbabwean	 cricket	 continued,	 in	 2004	 Heath	 Streak	 was	dismissed/resigned	 as	 captain	 and	14	players	 followed.	This	 turmoil	 created	 a	group	 of	 talented	 cricketers	 who	 saw	 little	 immediate	 future	 in	 Zimbabwean	cricket	and	the	offer	of	a	stable	County	Cricket	contract	was	enticing.		In	South	Africa	 the	political	upheaval	 in	 cricket	was	 caused	 through	 the	imposition	of	racial	quotas	within	sports	teams	in	the	post	apartheid	era.	Sport	was	 specifically	 mentioned	 in	 the	 1994	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development	Programme:		‘3.5.3	 Sport	 and	 recreation	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 reconstructing	 and		 developing	a	healthier	society.	Sport	and	recreation	should	cut	across	all		 developmental	 programmes,	 and	 be	 accessible	 and	 affordable	 for	 all		 South	Africans,	 including	those	in	rural	areas,	the	young	and	the	elderly.		 The	RDP	must	facilitate	the	mobilising	of	resources	in	both	the	public	and		 private	sectors	to	redress	inequalities	and	enhance	this	vital	aspect	of	our		 society.’64	
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	The	burning	question	was	how	the	national	sides	in	cricket	and	rugby	would	be	transformed	to	better	represent	the	new	South	Africa.	However	as	Farland	and	Jennings	note	the	notion	of	representivity	is	dependent	on	a	number	of	different	factors	and	 it	requires	more	 justification	that	a	case	of	profiling	the	nation	and	the	 team.65	During	 the	 late	 1990’s	 there	 were	 a	 number	 of	 controversial	selections	and	 the	 introduction	of	 a	Monitoring	Committee	 reviewing	 selection	decisions	and	a	threat	of	formal	quotas.66	Eventually	racial	quotas	and	targets	for	2003	were	 introduced	by	 the	UCB.67	These	were	however	scrapped	 in	2002	by	the	UCB	for	the	national	and	senior	provincial	sides.	Kevin	Pietersen	claimed	the	operation	 of	 the	 quotas	 was	 a	 central	 reason	 for	 his	 decision	 to	 leave	 South	Africa	and	seek	an	international	career	with	England.	Disagreements	over	racial	’targets’	 and	 ‘guidelines’	 have	 continued	 to	 emerge	 when	 controversies	 over	selections	 have	 appeared.	 In	March	 2008	Charl	 Langeveldt	withdrew	 from	 the	tour	to	India	after	the	controversy	surrounding	his	selection	ahead	of	Andre	Nel;			 ‘The	 controversy	 centred	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 South	 African	 coach	 Mickey	Arthur	 had	 insisted	 on	 Nel	 being	 in	 the	 squad,	 but	 it	 is	 alleged	 that	Langeveldt	was	picked	to	lift	the	number	of	black	players	to	comply	with	the	“target”	of	seven	black	players	in	a	14-man	squad’.68		Langeveldt	 issued	a	statement	 to	 the	effect	 that	he	did	not	want	 to	be	selected	solely	 on	 grounds	 of	 his	 colour.	 The	 impact	 was	 that	 both	 players,	 Nel	 and	Langeveldt,	were	 lost	to	South	African	cricket	when	they	signed	for	Surrey	and	Derbyshire	 respectively	 under	 the	 Kolpak	 principle.69	Arthur	 himself	 later	resigned	 citing	 differences	 with	 Cricket	 South	 Africa	 over	 their	 vision	 for	 the	national	side.70	The	English	Counties	offered	an	escape	route	for	those	cricketers	who	for	whatever	reason	were	dissatisfied.	This	exodus	led	to	Ken	Borland	in	the	
Natal	Witness	 referring	 to	 Kolpak,	 somewhat	melodramatically,	 as	 ‘the	 rape	 of	South	 African	 cricket’,	71	and	 there	 was	 great	 concern	 about	 the	 loss	 of	 young	talent:		 ‘The	 flood	 of	 players	 leaving	 for	 England,	 even	 if	 they	 would	 not	 have	represented	 south	 Africa,	 has	 weakened	 the	 domestic	 game	 in	 South	Africa.	CSA’s	first	reaction	was	to	ban	such	players	from	domestic	cricket	in	 South	 Africa.	 But	 they	 quickly	 realised	 that	 this	 would	 affect	 the	standard	 of	 the	 domestic	 game,	 and	 since	May	 2008	 they	 have	 allowed	each	franchise	to	field	three	Kolpak	players’.72			The	 obvious	 influx	 of	Kolpak	players	 in	 England	became	 apparent	 at	 a	 County	game	in	2008	between	Leicestershire	v	Northamptonshire	at	Grace	Rd	with	13	overseas	players,	of	whom	a	number	were	Kolpak	signings,	participating.73	The	number	of	players	not	qualified	to	play	for	England,	whether	identified	as	Kolpak	or	not,	was	becoming	a	major	anxiety	 for	 the	ECB.	However	 the	Counties	were	more	 concerned	with	 their	 own	 domestic	 affairs	 and	 Kolpak,	 and	 other	 non	 -qualified	 players,	 offered	 a	 potentially	 quick	 route	 to	 ‘success’.	 One	 potential	route	 for	 the	 ECB	 was	 to	 incentivise	 the	 Counties	 to	 not	 sign	 non-qualified	players.	At	the	end	of	the	2004	season	the	ECB	announced	a	new	set	of	financial	inducements.	The	key	element	was	that	part	of	the	fee	paid	from	the	ECB	to	each	
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County	would	have	a	performance	dimension.		The	most	important	of	the	criteria	related	 to	 qualification	 to	 play	 for	 England	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 internationals	produced		(including	England	A	and	age	groups)	and	the	contracted	players	who	were	England	qualified	with	extra	emphasis	on	those	under	23.74		This	approach,	of	investing	in	English	qualified	players	at	domestic	level	was	further	outlined	in	the	2005-2009	Strategic	Plan.			
‘Counties	will	be	rewarded	for	the	development	of	England	cricketers	and	provided	 with	 resources	 to	 monitor	 the	 performance	 of	 all	 England	Qualified	 cricketers	 in	 each	 First	 Class	 match	 by	 2006.	 Those	 financial	incentives	will	rise	to	the	equivalent	of	ten	per	cent	of	income	by	2009.	‘75		The	importance	of	a	successful	English	national	side	was	stressed	in	the	strategic	plan	 that	 sought	 to	 further	 embed	 rewards	 for	 the	 counties	 development	 of	English	players:		 ‘The	 goal	 is	 to	 have	 a	 minimum	 of	 50	 Under	 26	 England	 qualified	cricketers	playing	 first	 class	 cricket	by	2011	and	by	2013	50%	of	 those	players	 to	 be	 in	 the	 top	 half	 of	 either	 the	 bowling	 or	 batting	 first	 class	averages.’76				The	English	approach,	using	income,	to	incentivise	Counties	not	to	contract	non	England	qualified	players	was	adopted	in	South	Africa	but	in	a	slightly	different	format.	The	fundamental	question,	below	the	upper	echelons	of	the	game,	was	to	produce	 more	 black	 cricketers	 whilst	 at	 the	 higher	 levels	 it	 was	 to	 keep	 the	young	talent	away	from	the	predatory	English	Counties.	In	its	Annual	Report	of	2006/7,	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer,	 Gerald	 Majola	 specifically	 referred	 to	 the	Kolpak	issue.	He	noted	that;	‘CSA	now	regards	the	matter	as	(a)	serious	drain	on	its	 elite	 player	 pool.’	77		 Majola	 also	 sought	 to	 make	 it	 clear	 that	 it	 wasn’t	 the	transformation	policy	 that	was	causing	 the	problem	but	 rather	 the	 ‘strength	of	sterling	 against	 the	 rand’.	 	 Part	 of	 the	 proposed	 solution	 to	 retain	 the	 players’	loyalty	 was	 to	 set	 out	 a	 new	 agreement	 (a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding)	between	CSA	and	the	players	union,	SACA.				SACA’s	proposals	contained	a	specific	reference	to	Kolpak:		 7.1	The	MOU	seeks	 to	protect	 the	 interests	of	 South	African	 cricket	 and	retain,	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 Players	within	 the	 game	 in	 South	Africa.	 	 This	includes	 provision	 for	 “carve-outs”	 in	 all	 county	 contracts,	 player	clearance	processes	and	Kolpak	player	regulation.	78		This	 suggested	 a	 joint	 approach	 that	 if	 the	 rewards	 were	 sufficient	 player	movement	 to	England	would	diminish.	This	would	 clearly	benefit	 those	driven	by	financial	considerations	but	not	those	who	had	issues	with	the	transformation	policies.	What	was	being	evidenced	was	the	enacting	of	incentives	in	both	South	Africa	and	England.				
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Kolpak	‘Reform’	In	 addition	 to	 this	 less	 than	 wholly	 successful	 attempt	 to	 regulate	internally,	 an	 alternative	 strategy	was	 also	 adopted	 to	 seek	 clarification	 of	 the	Cotonou	agreement	as	it	had	been	‘understood’	post	Kolpak.	Contemporaneously	the	European	Commission	was	forging	a	new	approach	to	Sport	through	a	White	Paper	that	recognised	the	‘specificity	of	sport’.79	 In	its	evidence	to	the	House	of	Commons	 Culture,	 Media	 and	 Sport	 Select	 Committee	 (on	 the	 Sport	 White	Paper),	 the	 ECB	 noted	 that	 around	 80%	 of	 income	 was	 generated	 by	international	cricket.	The	ECB	also	expressed	concerns	about	the	free	movement	of	players,	 noting	 that	80	non	English	qualified	 cricketers	had	appeared	 in	 the	County	 game	 the	 previous	 season.	 However	 this	was	 not	 just	 an	 issue	 for	 the	ECB:		 ‘There	 have	 been	 significant	 problems	 caused	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	West	Indies	and	there	are	concerns	for	the	future	being	expressed	in	both	Australia	and	New	Zealand.	Furthermore,	the	absence	of	any	meaningful	legitimate	 means	 of	 limiting	 unqualified	 cricketers	 is	 straining	relationships	with	the	South	African	and	West	Indies	cricket	boards	who	view	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Kolpak	 principles	 as	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	 their	development	 of	 players.	 Such	 is	 the	 legitimate	 concern	 within	 South	Africa	 that	 the	 chairman	 of	 their	 board	 recently	 made	 a	 dedicated	personal	visit	to	the	UK	to	solicit	the	maximum	support	possible	from	ECB	to	correct	a	situation	which	is	damaging	to	cricket	in	South	Africa’.80		What	is	however	more	intriguing	that	this	general	view	of	the	threat	of	Kolpak,	both	home	and	abroad,	was	the	ECB’s	perception	of	the	limits	to	the		Kolpak	case.	In	his	oral	evidence	to	the	Committee	Giles	Clarke,	the	then	Chairman	of	the	ECB,	in	reply	to	a	question,	commented:		 ‘I	 would	 be	 very	 delighted	 if	 the	 Committee	 were	 to	 focus	 in	 on	 the	question	 of	 how	 we	 have	 a	 situation	 where	 English	 cricket	 cannot	 be	allowed	 to	 manage	 its	 own	 affairs	 because,	 as	 you	 rightly	 state,	 a	Slovakian	 handball	 player	 wished	 to	 play	 in	 the	 second	 division	 of	 the	German	handball	league.	That	decision	in	the	European	court	following	a	trade	 treaty	 known	 as	 the	 Cotonou	 Agreement,	 whose	 participants	 had	little	 understanding	 of	 what	 the	 consequences	 would	 be—	 that	 was	drawn	by	a	certain	group	of	lawyers	to	have	a	definite	conclusion	that	it	provided	the	right	of	free	movement	of	labour	from	citizens	of	a	country	signing	 the	 Cotonou	 Agreement—is	 where	 our	 Kolpak	 problem,	 which	you	have	correctly	analysed,	comes	from.	We	would	welcome	clarity.	We	want	clarity	to	manage	our	sport	above	all.	There	is	no	clarity	in	that	area	and	we	do	not	believe	it	 is	the	purpose	of	a	governing	body	to	spend	its	time	 and	money	 trying	 to	 establish	 legal	 test	 cases	 but,	 rather,	with	 all	due	respect	to	yourselves,	for	the	politicians	to	legislate	and	us	to	comply	with	the	law.’	81		Leaving	aside	the	issue	that	it	wasn’t	the	Cotonou	agreement	that	was	the	subject	of	 Kolpak,	 although	 as	 noted	 above	 the	 relevant	 clauses	 on	 discrimination	 in	employment	don’t	differ,	the	evidence	suggests	a	misunderstanding	of	the	actual	
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decision.	The	outcome	was	not	and	never	was	freedom	of	movement	from	ACP	countries	akin	to	Bosman.	However	Clarke	seems	to	be	suggesting	this	was	the	ECB’s	 interpretation:	 ‘it	 provided	 the	 right	 of	 free	 movement	 of	 labour	 from	citizens	of	a	country	signing	the	Cotonou	Agreement.’	This	view	perhaps	explains	why	more	 restrictive	 barriers	 to	 initial	 entry	 and	 gaining	 lawful	 employment,	that	then	triggered	the	right	not	be	discriminated,	against	weren’t	enacted.	This	also	clarifies	the	approach	to	the	Commission	by	two	British	Conservative	MEPs.					Robert	Sturdy	and	Sir	Robert	Atkins,	submitted	similar	written	questions	to	the	European	 Commission,	 the	 former	 in	May	 2008	 and	 the	 latter	 in	 June	 2008.82	Robert	Sturdy	asked:			 ‘Sports	 governing	 bodies	 are	 greatly	 confused	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 or	specific	 guidance	 from	 the	 Commission	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	Cotonou	 Agreement	 on	 the	 freedom	 of	 movement	 of	 professional	sportsmen	from	countries	such	as	South	Africa	and	Caribbean	countries.		 Sports	 governing	 bodies	 have	 provided	 evidence	 to	 the	 Commission	 on	the	 potential	 damage	 that	 this	 agreement	 could	 cause	 to	 international	sporting	 relationships	 and	 their	 own	 national	 sporting	 structures.	Commission	officials	have	recently	suggested	to	sports	governing	bodies	that,	 in	 their	opinion,	 the	Cotonou	Agreement	does	not	provide	 freedom	of	movement	rights.		 Could	 the	Commission	please	make	 an	unequivocal	 statement	 clarifying	whether	or	not	 the	Cotonou	Agreement	provides	 freedom	of	movement	for	professional	sportsmen	to	play	within	the	European	Community?’	83		A	month	later	Sir	Robert	Atkins	further	enquired;			 ‘Can	 the	 Commission	 confirm	 what	 its	 advice	 is	 to	 sports	 governing	bodies	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Cotonou	Agreement	 on	 the	 freedom	 of	movement	 and	worker	 rights	of	professional	 sportsmen	and	women?	 Is	the	 Commission	 aware	 of	 the	 considerable	 confusion	 surrounding	 the	application	of	the	Cotonou	Agreement	to	sport,	and	how	does	it	intend	to	provide	 greater	 clarity	 so	 that	 sports	 governing	 bodies	 can	 act	 with	confidence	and	certainty?’84			The	 response	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Commission,	 by	 Mr	 Spidla,	 provided	 some	reassurance	for	the	ECB;			 ‘The	Commission	would	like,	however,	to	clarify	that	access	of	the	above	third‑country	nationals	to	the	labour	market	of	Member	States	is	a	matter	for	 domestic	 law.	 Decisions	 whether	 to	 allow	 access	 to	 employment	 in	sports	 clubs	 in	 Member	 States	 are,	 therefore,	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	competent	national	authorities.	(July	2008)85	
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	This	‘clarification’	made	clear	the	limits	to	the	decision	that	legal	commentators	had	 suggested	 all	 along.	 It	 enabled	 the	 ECB	 to	 tighten	 the	 requirements	 for	participation	by	 creating	more	hurdles	 for	 prospective	 players.	More	 stringent	qualifications	 to	 participate	 and	 gain	 lawful	 employment	 at	 the	 outset	 were	introduced	 thus	 sidestepping	 Kolpak.	 This	 was	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 extreme	uncertainty	 for	 the	English	 cricket	 authorities	 caused	by	 a	 restructuring	of	 the	nationalities	 of	 professional	 cricketers.	 Control	 over	 terms	 and	 conditions	was	attacked	by	 the	Greig	decision	but	Kolpak	 threatened	 to	 alter	 the	playing	body	itself	much	as	Bosman	had	effected	 football.	At	 the	heart	of	 this	 issue	were	 the	different	 interests	of	the	County	Clubs	who	were	financially	precarious	and	the	requirements	of	 the	national	side	 that	needed	a	strong	English	qualified	player	pool.	 Whilst	 nationality	 had	 been	 used	 flexibly,	 by	 the	 national	 selectors	 to	encompass	 talented	 South	 African	 players	 with	 parental	 qualification,	 other	overseas	 immigration	 had	 been	 tightly	 restricted.	Kolpak	offered	 the	 potential	for	almost	unlimited	overseas	player	 involvement	unless	 the	Counties	could	be	dissuaded.	 The	 development	 of	 English	 qualified	 talent	 became	 part	 of	 the	solution,	 as	 did	 the	 retention	 of	 South	 African	 players	 within	 South	 Africa.	Control	 has	 been	 exerted	 through	 central	 contracts	 and	 the	 outcome	 a	 clearer	more	unified	view	on	the	way	ahead	to	produce	a	successful	national	side.	This	foundation	has	then	allowed	Counties	to	bring	in	the	best	 international	players	on	short	term	contracts	not	 for	the	County	matches	but	the	shorter	versions	of	the	game	notably	Twenty/20.							
Conclusion	Analysis	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Kolpak	case	 and	 the	 subsequent	 reaction	 to	 the	influx	of	players	provides	a	portrait	of	the	historical	development	of	cricket.	The	spread	 of	 cricket	 into	 the	 Southern	 hemisphere	 through	 the	 Empire	 is	 a	 key	element.	 If	 cricket	 had	 not	 been	 linked	 to	 the	 Empire	 but	 been	 developed	throughout	Europe	the	decision	wouldn’t	have	made	any	difference	though	the	earlier	 Bosman	 case	 would	 have	 had	 more	 impact.	 The	 natural	 links	 back	 to	English	 cricket	 from	 South	Africa	 and	 Zimbabwe	highlighted	 the	 opportunities	greater	freedom	of	movement	provided.	The	ability	to	limit	the	potential	arrival	of	players	was	mired	in	an	inevitably	muddied	definition	of	who	was	or	could	be	an	‘English’	cricketer.	Coupled	with	political	problems	within	African	cricket	the	timing	 of	Kolpak	worked	well	 for	 those	players	who	 saw	 little	 future	 at	 home.	The	capacity	to	sign	high	quality	already	developed	players	also	opened	up	the	apparent	division	between	 the	short	 term	 interests	of	 the	County	Clubs,	as	 the	employers,	 and	 the	 national	 governing	 body.	 The	 dispute	 was	 reminiscent	 in	some	ways	of	the	aftermath	of	WSC	when	again	the	Counties	didn’t	want	to	lose	those	 players	 who	 delivered	much	 needed	 commercial	 success.	 	 Aside	 for	 the	political	 dimension	 a	 County	 contract	 offered	 an	 economic	 opportunity	 and	 a	greater	degree	of	security	than	might	otherwise	be	available.	One	of	the	driving	factors	for	the	recruitment	of	players	into	WSC	was	the	perceived	underpayment	of	players	and	this	was	also	clearly	present	at	this	time.	The	Greig	case	had	also	
	 17	










Reports	English	 Cricket	 Board	 (2005)	 Building	 Partnerships:	 cricket’s	 Strategic	 Plan	2005	-	2009:	From	Playground	to	test	arena.				English	Cricket	Board	(2010)	Grounds	to	Play:	ECB	Strategic	Plan	2010	-2013.																																																									1	Whilst	an	‘over’	is	now	a	standard	6	deliveries	it	has	varied	from	4	to	8	and	the	first	One-Day	International	in	Melbourne	on	January	5th	1971	consisted	of	40	eight	ball	overs.	http://www.espncricinfo.com/ci/engine/current/match/64148.html	(last	accessed	19th	August	2016)	2	Stephen	Wagg  ‘To	Be	an	Englishman’:	Nation,	Ethnicity	and	English	Cricket	in	the	Global	Age,	2007,	Sport	in	Society,	10:1,	11-32.	See	also	Mike	Marqusee,	
Anyone	But	England:	Cricket	and	the	National	Malaise,	(1994,	London,	Verso)			3	The	coverage	and	materials	on	African	cricket	appears	on	first	sight	rather	limited.	The	MCC	library,	for	example,	has	little	specific	material	that	covers	countries	beyond	South	Africa	and	Zimbabwe.	See	the	notable	exception	of	Frederik	Butler,	Cricket	in	Nigeria	(xxxx:	,	1946).		Some	of	Butler’s	papers	are	available	via	Commonwealth	and	African	Studies	section	at	Bodleain	Library,	GB	0162	MSS.Afr.s.1831.	Butler	also	played	for	Nigeria	until	1947. 4	The	other	seven	sides	were	the	six	Test	Playing	nations	comprising	(the	hosts)	England,	Australia,	India,	New	Zealand,	Pakistan	and	the	West	Indies.	Sri	Lanka	participated	as	the	leading	Associate	Member	of	the	ICC.		5	The	team	lost	all	three	matches;	by	181	runs	to	New	Zealand,	by	10	wickets	to	India	and	by	196	runs	to	England.	The	Kenyan	cricketer	Ramesh	Sethi,	who	top	scored	against	England	with	30	runs,	proceeded	to	have	a	Minor	Counties	career	with	Shropshire.	http://www.cricketarchive.com/Archive/Players/1/1464/1464.html		More	recently	a	combined	Africa	XI	played	a	combined	Asia	XI	for	the	Afro-Asia	Cup	and	the	matches	were	awarded	One	Day	International	(ODI)	status.	The	first	series	of	three	matches	took	place	in	2005	and	ended	1-1	with	the	trophy	shared.	The	African	squad	comprised	of	14	South	Africans,	three	Zimbabweans	and	three	Kenyans.	 The	 Second	 Afro-Asia	 cup	 took	 place	 in	 2007	 and	 the	 African	 squad	contained	13	South	Africans,	three	Zimbabweans	and	two	Kenyans.	There	was	a	separate	Twenty	20	Squad	that	had	four	South	Africans,	four	Kenyans	and	three	Zimbabweans.	The	Asian	team	won	3-0.	6	See	generally		http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/62/icc-organisation/history	(last	accessed	14	April	2016).	7	See	The	Times	27	July	1909,	p19.	The	Minutes	also	dealt	with	the	commercial	dimension	setting	out	the	price	of	admission	of	1s	for	Test	Matches	with	the	gross	gate	proceeds	shared	equally.		
	 19	
																																																																																																																																																														8	Membership	of	the	ICC	is	divided	into	3	categories;	Full,	Associate	and	Affiliated.	Associate	Membership	was	introduced	in	1965	for	those	countries	who	could	not	meet	the	demands	of	playing	test	cricket	with	Fiji	and	USA	the	first	to	join.	9	The	shock	result	in	1996	was	provided	by	Kenya	who	easily	beat	the	West	Indies	whilst	in	the	1999	competition	Zimbabwe	beat	both	India	and	latterly	South	Africa	to	proceed	and	eliminate	England.	10	See	Derek	Birley,	A	Social	History	of	English	Cricket,	(1999,	Arum	press,	London).	The	MCC	does	have	a	strong	historic	presence	as	well	as	the	physical	ownership	of	Lord’s	that	is	undoubtedly	viewed	as	the	home	of	cricket.	The	MCC	is	still	the	owner	of	the	Laws	of	the	Game	though	match	regulations	for	particular	games	may	vary.		https://www.lords.org/mcc/laws-of-cricket/laws/	(last	accessed	19th	August	2016)	For	an	insiders	view	of	Lord’s	see:	Sir	Pelham	Warner,	Lord’s	1787-1945,	(Harrap,	London,	1946).	11	Greig	and	Others	v	Insole	and	Others	[1978]	1	WLR	302.	12	Deutscher	Handballbund	v	Maros	Kolpak	(C-438/00	ECR	1-4135),	hereafter	







29 Youseff Ibrahim, ‘Olympics Committee Ends Its Ban On Participation by South 
Africa’, New York Times, 1991, July 9, available online via 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/10/sports/olympics-olympics-committee-ends-







International	Review	for	the	Sociology	of	Sport,	36/3	(2001)	319	-336.’		67	Ibid	68	Desai	and	Vahed,	‘Beyond	the	nation?’,	197.		69	Nel	chooses	Kolpak	deal	at	Surrey	25th	March	2009.	ECB	website	available	via	http://www.ecb.co.uk/news/domestic/nel-calls-time-on-international-career,304670,EN.html		70	David	Hopps,	South	Africa's	quota	debate	reopens	after	Mickey	Arthur's	resignation,	27th	January,	2010.	The	Guardian.	Available	online	via		http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2010/jan/27/mickey-arthur-south-africa-quotas		71	K	Borland,	‘The	rape	of	South	Africa’s	resources,	2008,	cricinfo,		noted	in	Desai	and	Vahed,	‘Beyond	the	nation?’,	200.	72	Desai	and	Vahed,	‘Beyond	the	nation?’,	200-201.	73	The	Leicestershire	side	contained	the	following;	5	South	Africans;	HD	Ackerman,	Boeta	Dippenaar,	Jacques	du	Toit,	Claude	Henderson	and	Dillon	du	Preez,	one	Australian	Jim	Allenby	and	the	West	Indian	Jermaine	Lawson.	The	Northamptonshire	overseas	players	were	Nicky	Boje,	Riki	Wessels,	Lance	Klusener,	Andrew	Hall,	and	Johan	van	der	Wath	all	from	South	Africa.	74	See	‘FCF	rule	on	performance	payments’,	ECB	website	available	via	http://www.ecb.co.uk/archive/article/2026	(last	accessed	14	April	2016).	75	English	 Cricket	 Board	 (2005)	 Building	 Partnerships:	 cricket’s	 Strategic	 Plan	2005	-	2009:	From	Playground	to	test	arena:		p17.	Available	online	via	http://www.ecb.co.uk/sites/default/files/building-partnerships-crickets-strategic-plan-2005-2009-602.pdf		76	ECB	(2010)	Grounds	to	PlayPage	30.	Available	online	via	http://www.ecb.co.uk/sites/default/files/grounds-to-play-11040.pdf	
	 23	
																																																																																																																																																															77	Cricket	South	Africa	2006/7	Annual	Report,	p	8.	Available	online	via	http://ipublish.cc/wp/csa/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/12/2006-2007-CSA-Annual-Report-and-Financial-Statement.pdf		78	Executive	Summary	Of	SACA’s	Proposals	For	The	MoU.		79	White	Paper	On	Sport	Brussels,	11.7.2007	COM(2007)	391	final.		80	House	of	Commons	Culture,	Media	and	Sport	Select	Committee,	European	Commission	White	Paper	on	Sport,	2008	HC	347.	Ev	2	English	Cricket	Board.	Interestingly	Cricket	South	Africa	also	gave	evidence	to	the	same	Committee.	81	House	of	Commons	Culture,	Media	and	Sport	Select	Committee,	European	Commission	White	Paper	on	Sport,	2008	HC	347.	Ev	6	English	Cricket	Board.	82	It	is	not	clear	why	two	such	similar	questions	were	asked	so	close	to	each	other.			83 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2008-2771&language=EN		84 	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=P-2008-3333&language=EN			85	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2008-3333&language=EN		
